Autonomy for Pattani

I was recently in Pattani, one of three problematic provinces in the southern part of Thailand, when two bombs exploded and killed 10 military officials in Yala and Narathiwat, the other two restive provinces.

Just a few weeks ago another bomb exploded in a mosque in Pattani, killing two people. Bombings and shootings have become almost routine in the region.

As usual, no figure nor organization claimed the responsibility for the attack. Instead of demanding certain purposes, actors of those violence are just trying to terrorize people and to create anarchy.

The Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) are illegitimate to voice insurgents’ aspirations as new groups have emerged and flourished rapidly. The last two bombs, for example, were masterminded by Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK), a new group led by Mana Samae.

In response to the increasing incidents, the government has seemed to exercise the same policy as previous attempts to quell the violence, a security approach. Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva has already ordered the National Security Council (NSC) to take action.

The story might not be different from previous incidents. Military will tighten security control, conduct the revenge attack, and arrest some suspects. Yet, the problem is that the government is less interested in thinking of policies beyond the security approach.

To understand this conflict perfectly, we should not think that rebellions are the only trouble makers that have been creating fear and worry. In contrast, we must put both rebellions and the government as the two actors that have to be responsible with all tragedies in the South.

The killing of hundreds of Malay Muslim for the sake of Thaksin Sinawatra’s drug war and the death of 32 people in historic Krue Zue mosque and 82 in Tak Bai incidents have never been investigated by the government. No military officers are charged if there are any cases of abuses.

Despite a door of hope when Abhisit re-activated the civil-led Southern Border Province Administrative Centre (SBPAC) that is responsible for socio economic development in the region, attempts to bring about peace are not gaining tremendous positive results because the government has not addressed the main issue in the South.

Security, economic, and social issues are indeed necessary. Nevertheless, I observed that people in those three provinces already enjoy robust economic and social life. The average income in the region is higher than in other provinces, such as the North and Northeast provinces.

Then, what do they want? Do they aim to create an independent Islamic kingdom? Some groups, yes. But most people do not care for this idea.

Although almost all women wear veil and men wear sarong, only small minority of them romanticize about an Islamic sultanate. Moreover, it is essential to say that based on my interviews with religious leaders in that conflict area, violence are brought by kaum tuo, Malay-chauvinists and traditionalist Muslims, whose beliefs lie in mysticism and holy readings that are not limited only to the Koran.

At the same time, kaum mudo, who are modernist, revivalist, and Wahhabist Muslims are passive and prefer to work on economic and social activities.

Thus, those who demand independence are dominated and driven more by “Malay factors” than “Islam factors”. Islam is only utilized to legitimize their action. That explains why Muslims in Bangkok and other provinces have less sympathy with the insurgency and enjoy the mutual and harmonic relations with the Thai state.

Unfortunately, current policy refuses to deal with the Malay factor as the main issue. According to a research by Dr. Srisompob Jitirompsri, 83.9 percent of ethnic Malay leaders are in favor of autonomy, rather than the current system.

Bangkok must lift its reluctance to discuss this issue. It has to transform some degrees of political and economic authorities to provinces. Let people set local governments that match their desires, but still under the Thai-state. To ethnic Malays in the South, political decentralization could not only preserve their dignity, but also drag them out of the cycle of violence.

Bangkok politicians need to consider to learn from Indonesia’s experience in delivering political and fiscal autonomy, which contributes tremendously to minimize any attempts to disintegrate.

Although there are still controversies in Aceh with regards to sharia law and in Papua on the widespread of “local corruption”, it is clear that incidents are decreasing and people begin to realize that democracy and autonomy already give them more chance to elect their own leaders, to increase political participation, and to enjoy larger portions of economy.